Search results for "Contract timing"
showing 2 items of 2 documents
The effect of early or late R&D inbound alliance on innovation
2016
In the research-and-development (R&D) supply chain, firms can agree an inbound alliance at different times along the R&D process; this decision affects the supplier's effort and the innovation that firms achieve at the end of the agreement. Because the supplier's effort is not entirely observable, firms cannot enforce effort contractually. Early contracts demand greater effort and offer risk-sharing opportunities; in late contracts suppliers have a stronger ex-ante bargaining-power position because of the shorter (and less risky) contract length and the experience suppliers already have. This study argues that later inbound alliances allow a higher innovation value when both partner…
Modulate research effort in inbound alliance
2014
We address the R&D supply chain where a customer wants to sign an R&D contract with a supplier in an inbound open innovation style. Supplier has to decide how much effort put on contract: effort is assumed as nonobservable then it cannot be constrained contractually. We model the R&D process like a staged one, which allows for both an early contract and a late one. The overall committed effort depends on the alliance timing: earlier contracts will ask for a greater cumulated effort although they offer risk-sharing opportunity. On the other hand, later contracts see supplier with a stronger ex-ante bargaining power position, due to shorter (and then less risky) contract length and experience…